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The Use of Cocaine By Pregnant Women:
Child Abuse or Choice?
I. Introduction
The question of how to properly define the sphere of a pregnant woman's auton-
omy is a familiar one. The Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade' and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey2 appear to have centered the debate around the pregnant
woman's ability to legally terminate her pregnancy as encompassed in a constitutional
right to privacy.3 In recent years, however, a new twist has emerged. In an effort to
protect the unborn child, prosecutors in many states have pressed charges against wom-
en who took drugs while pregnant.4 Such women have been charged with a wide
range of offenses from child abuse and neglect to delivery of a controlled substance to
a minor, and with mixed results. A diverse group of interests are challenging these
prosecutions on constitutional and medical grounds.' Many states, however, argue that
they possess a constitutional and justified interest in the health and welfare of an un-
born child, especially a fetus that is viable outside the womb.6
This Note will consider the propriety of these recent efforts by the states. Part II
of this Note will consider the effects of cocaine on the unborn child. Part III will dis-
cuss the methods employed by the states in their efforts to protect the unborn child
from exposure to cocaine in utero. In particular, attempts to prosecute under state
statutes proscribing child abuse and the delivery of a controlled substance to a minor
will be examined. Part IV will address and respond to the concerns most often ex-
pressed about such prosecutions. These include the possible harmful deterrent effects,
slippery slope fears, constitutional arguments, and judicial activism concerns. Part V
concludes that the recent efforts attempting to protect the unborn child are not only
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing the privacy right of married
couples to use contraception and explaining the origin of this right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (extending the right to use contraception to unmarried individuals).
4. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864
S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992); Reyes v. Superior Court, 141
Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. C. App. 1977); State v. Carter, 602 So. 2d 995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); State
v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991), app. denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
5. See Barbara Kantrowitz et al., The Pregnancy Police, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 1991, at 52 (dis-
cussing objections to legislation that regulates a pregnant woman's behavior by the National Organi-
zation of Women and the American Civil Liberties Union); see generally Michelle D. Mills, Comment
Fetal Abuse Prosecutions: The Triumph of Reaction Over Reason, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 989 (1998);
Dawn Johnsen, Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 569,
579 (1992).
6. See generally James Freeman, Prenatal Substance Abuse: Texas, Texans and Future Texans
Can't Afford It, 37 S. TEx. L. REv. 539 (1996).
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appropriate, but constitutional as well. States have a legitimate, compelling and consti-
tutional interest in the health of a viable fetus. As medical knowledge increases, the
deleterious effects of maternal drug abuse will become only more apparent.7 It is time
for states to cease tolerating this behavior.
II. The Effects
All too often, women who are pregnant abuse drugs. It is estimated that as many
as eleven percent of pregnant women have used an illegal drug during pregnancy, and
of those women, seventy-five percent have used cocaine." As a result, approximately
375,000 babies each year begin their life addicted to an illicit drug.' According to
some accounts, more than 500,000 cocaine-exposed infants will be born each year in
the United States by the year 2000.0 The effect of such behavior on the unborn is
devastating and oftentimes leads to serious and permanent health consequences." It
also may result in the death of the fetus. Nevertheless, the abuse of cocaine by preg-
nant women is becoming more common among both urban and suburban populations.
Up to forty-five percent of women cared for at urban teaching hospitals took cocaine
during their pregnancies and in a recent study six percent of the infants born at a pri-
vate suburban hospital had traces of cocaine in their system.
2
The maternal use of cocaine is associated with major alterations in fetal brain
structure which results in neurologic, cognitive and behavioral malfunctions. 3 The
most common health problem found in infants of cocaine-abusing mothers is a brain
abnormality called microcephaly, in which the intrauterine brain growth of the fetus is
7. See, e.g., Joseph J. Volpe, M.D., Effects of Cocaine Use on the Fetus, 327 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 399 (1992); Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 666
(1985).
8. See Report of the American Medical Association Board of Trustees, Legal Interventions Dur-
ing Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663 (Nov. 28, 1990); See, e.g., State v. Krzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482, 495
(Wis. Ct App. 1995) (citing statistics from Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, where 10% to 15% of
babies are born to mothers who used cocaine during preganacy); Lisa J. Keyes, Comment, Rethinking
the Aim of the "War on Drugs": States' Roles in Preventing Substance Abuse by Pregnant Women,
1992 Wis. L. REV. 197, 201 (1992) (nationwide studies indicate that approximately 11% of all babies
born test positive for illicit drugs).
9. Margaret P. Spencer, Prosecutorial Immunity: The Response to Prenatal Drug Use, 25 CONN.
L. REV. 393 (1993) (citing a study by the National Association of Perinatal Addiction Research and
Education).
10. See id. at 394 (claiming that the number of cocaine-exposed newborns each year may be
between 500,000 and 4,000,000).
11. Cocaine ingested by the mother travels through the umbilical cord and across the placenta
barrier to the fetus. Once the fetal tissue absorbs the cocaine, it does not immediately recirculate it to
the mother's bloodstream. The cocaine metabolites are trapped within the fetus, where the child may
receive ten or more rushes with every "hit" by the mother. See Ira Chasnoff, Perinatal Effects of
Cocaine, CONrEMP. OB/GYN, May 1987, at 162; Sue Miller, Moms: No "Safe" Time for Cocaine
Health: Recent Research has Found that Just One Hit of Cocaine Taken by a Pregnant Woman Can
Do Irreparable Damage to Her Fetus, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 1989, at I (discussing how physiological
response from a single dose of cocaine may cause devastating injury).
12. Volpe, supra note 7, at 399. For the purposes of this note, the effect of cocaine use on the
fetus will be explored. Obviously, the abuse of alcohol can have dire health repercussions for the fetus
and newborn infant. Fetal alcohol syndrom, for example, is the leading known cause of mental retar-
dation. See, Facts About FASIFAE (visited Feb. 20, 1999) <http://www.taconic.netseminarstfas-a.html>.
Furthermore, marijuana and other drugs can obviously harm the fetus as well. The prosecutions of
women who used drugs while pregnant, however, usually involve the use of cocaine. The prevelance
of cocaine in modem maternity wards, as well as its very damaging effects on the fetus, warrant a
brief review of its physical ramifications.
13. Volpe, supra note 7, at 399.
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retarded as evidenced by a smaller than normal fetal brain circumference.' 4 Micro-
cephaly is associated with lower intelligence quotients. 5 Destructive lesions may also
form on the brain of a fetus exposed to cocaine. In a recent study of a selected group
of seven infants with abnormalities associated with intrauterine exposure to cocaine,
three of the seven infants had brain clefts and collections of neurons in cerebral white
matter due to the severe impairment of neuronal migration, and two of the three also
had optic-nerve hypoplasia and were blind. 6 The remaining four infants had destruc-
tive brain lesions.'
Furthermore, the risk of sudden infant death syndrome in infants exposed to
cocaine is three to seven times higher than normal: "Both clinical and laboratory data
suggest that the regulation of respiration and arousal is impaired in infants exposed to
cocaine and that such impairment could presage the occurrence of the sudden infant
death syndrome." 8 A study by Joseph Volpe, M.D., concludes that cocaine use by
pregnant women is "associated with an increased incidence of prematurity, intrauterine
growth retardation, and microcephaly. In addition, there is now evidence of teratogen-
ic'9 effects on several aspects of brain development.... Cocaine also leads to de-
structive lesions in the brain of the fetus."'
Many other studies reaffirm these findings. For example, in a study of 17,466
pregnancies in the University of Illinois Perinatal Network, the risk of intrauterine
growth retardation, prematurity, and other adverse effects was high among pregnant
women who used cocaine.' During a study at the University of California at San
Francisco, the outcomes of pregnancies complicated by cocaine abuse were compared
to those of a matched control group selected from a general obstetric population. The
study observed a statistically significant increase in the incidence of premature separa-
tion of the placenta, low birth weight infants, preterm deliveries, and the incidence of
fetal distress requiring cesarean section.' A study at Northwestern University School
of Medicine found that cocaine-exposed infants had lower birth weight, shorter gesta-
tion and a smaller head circumference than infants in a control group.'
Unfortunately, the negative consequences of maternal cocaine abuse often do not
end after the birth of the child." The dysfunctional development of children born ad-
dicted to cocaine has given rise to what some have called a "biologic underclass" of
14. Id. at 400.
15. See Anastasia Toufexis, Innocent Victims: Damaged by the Drugs Their Mothers Took, Crack
Kids Will Face Social and Educational Hurdles and Must Count on Society's Compassion, TIME, May
13, 1991, at 57 (reporting that studies indicate that smaller head circumferences have been associated
with lower intelligence quotient scores).
16. Volpe, supra note 7 at 401.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 404.
19. Teratogenic effects are defined as those effects "causing abnormal fetal development."
Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1563 (25* ed. 1990).
20. Volpe, supra note 7 at 404.
21. Id. at 400.
22. H.R. Cohen, J.R. Green. W.R. Crombleholme, Peripartum Cocaine Use: Estimating Risk of
Adverse Pregnancy Outcome, 35 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS at 51
(1991).
23. See Ira Chasnoff et al., Cocaine and Pregnancy: Clinical and Toxicological Implications for
the Neonate, 35 CuNICAL CHEMISTRY at 1276-1278 (1989).
24. Toufexis, supra note 15.
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"crack kids."' These children must engage the usual challenges of childhood with an
innate handicap and are likely to require numerous state services to meet their special
medical, educational and emotional needs.2' As they develop, these children are easily
distracted, exhibit passive behavior, experience visual-perception problems and encoun-
ter difficulties with fine motor skills.' J. Harold Nickens, M.D., Chairman of the
D.C. Chapter of the American Society of Addiction Medicine, states that such children
are likely to experience the same dysphoria, thought and mood disorders experienced
by any recovering addict, but without the knowledge or support that is necessary for
them to stay sober.'
The long term behavior problems, developmental disabilities, learning disabilities
and central nervous system problems that can result from maternal cocaine abuse will
most certainly have a negative effect on the child's educational and social develop-
ment." Moreover, beyond the social and psychological problems that may persist in a
cocaine-exposed child are the more obvious physical deformities. Malformations of the
skull, eyes, central nervous system, genitals, urinary tract and kidneys are just some of
the horrors that can result when mothers ingest cocaine during pregnancy.'
The medical evidence is incontrovertible. The use of cocaine during pregnancy
hurts not only the mother but the unborn child as well. A single "hit" of cocaine taken
by a pregnant woman may be enough to cause permanent defects or even kill her
fetus." Many states have become cognizant of this tragedy and have taken steps to
fight maternal drug use. Among the more controversial methods employed by the
states in this effort include the prosecution of women who took drugs while pregnant.
HI. The Methods
As the medical evidence demonstrates, the protection of the unborn child from
maternal drug abuse has become a necessity. The ideal solution is for an expectant
mother with a substance abuse problem to immediately cease use of the drug, volun-
tarily admit herself into a treatment center and obtain the proper prenatal care she and
her baby need. Unfortunately, with approximately 375,000 children being born with
cocaine in their systems each year, the reality is that many mothers have failed to
adequately protect their babies.32 This is where the states have felt a need to inter-
vene.
Protection of the unborn child by states could come from any of the three
branches of government.3 3 The state legislatures could pass laws that explicitly
criminalized the use of cocaine by pregnant women, thereby attaching an additional
penalty on top of those already in place for cocaine use and possession. Without such
statutes, the judicial branch could take an active role by broadly interpreting current
child abuse or delivery of a controlled substance statutes to encompass maternal co-
25. Id. at 57.
26. Judy Howard, Chronic Drug Users as Parents, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 648 (1992).
27. Alcohol and Other Drug-Related Birth Defects, NCADD Fact Sheet (National Council on
Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1994, at 2.
28. See Courtland Milloy, A Time Bomb in Cocaine Babies, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1989, at B03.
29. Id.
30. Shona B. Glink, Note, The Prosecution of Maternal Fetal Abuse: Is This the Answer?, 1991
U. ILL. L. REV. 533.
31. See Miller, supra note 11.
32. See Spencer, supra note 9.
33. The three branches of government are the legislative, executive and judicial.
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caine abuse."' In light of the medical evidence, it is surprising that neither of these
branches have taken an active role. Instead, the state executive branches are actively
and sometimes creatively prosecuting women who abuse cocaine while pregnant."
This is in response to growing public support of criminal penalties for this type of
behavior.'
Since 1985, at least 200 women in thirty states have been criminally prosecuted
based upon their use of drugs while pregnant." Until 1997, however, every state su-
preme court that reviewed these convictions overturned them.' Past prosecutions and
current attempted prosecutions have for the most part fallen under one of two general
types of criminal statutes. First, statutes that proscribe the delivery of a controlled
substance to a minor have been applied to maternal drug abuse. Second, state prosecu-
tors are attempting to hold mothers who use drugs while pregnant liable under child
abuse statutes. Each of these two methods will be addressed below.
A. Delivery of a Controlled Substance to a Minor
In the absence of a law that specifically criminalized maternal drug abuse, state
prosecutors have creatively charged women who use drugs while pregnant with the
delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. Prosecutions in such cases are not based
on an argument that a fetus is a person, and thus a minor, and that the mother trans-
ferred cocaine to her unborn child via the umbilical cord. Rather, prosecutors focused
on the approximately one minute after birth but before the umbilical cord is cut. At
this point, the child is now fully born and thus a person under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment entitled to the full and equal protection of the laws." At the same time, howev-
er, the child is still attached to his or her mother and possibly receiving cocaine from
the mother's bloodstream.40
Arguably the most famous case of this kind is Johnson v. State.4' Jennifer
Clarice Johnson was convicted in the Circuit Court of Seminole County, Florida, of
delivering a controlled substance to her baby through the umbilical cord after birth.
Johnson admitted to smoking marijuana and crack cocaine three to four times every-
other-day throughout the duration of her pregnancy. Her daughter was subsequently
born addicted to cocaine. Two years earlier, in a previous pregnancy, Johnson admitted
to smoking crack cocaine during her pregnancy, and that child was born with traces of
cocaine in his system as well. The state of Florida argued that the passage of cocaine
34. See, e.g., Whimer v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
35. See, e.g., Johnson, 602 So. 2d 1288.
36. Mark Curriden, Holding Mom Accountable, A.B.A. J., March 1990, at 50 (citing a survey by
the Atlanta Constitution finding that 71 percent of the 1500 people polled favored criminal penalties
for pregnant women whose illegal drug use injures their babies).
37. Lynn Smith, Punish or Protect?, L.A. Times, Sept. 3, 1996, at El; Sarah Letitia Kowalski,
Looking for a Solution: Determining Fetal Status for Prenatal Drug Abuse Prosecutions, 38 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 1255 (1998).
38. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 4.
39. The Fourteenth Amendment reads: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction therof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
40. See Chasnoff, supra note 11.
41. Johnson, 602 So. 2d 1288.
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through the umbilical cord during the approximately one minute after birth before the
cord is cut violated the statutory prohibition against the adult delivery of a controlled
substance to a minor.42 The Florida Supreme.Court, however, held that the legislative
history of the statute did not show a manifest intent to use the word "delivery" in the
context of criminally prosecuting mothers for the delivery of a controlled substance to
a minor by way of the umbilical cord.43
Similarly, in Sheriff of Washoe County v. Encoe,' the defendant was charged
with delivery of a controlled substance to her newborn child after urine samples from
the infant following birth tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines.
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded, as did the court in Johnson, that the Nevada
legislature never intended to include the action of the defendant under the delivery stat-
ute:
To interpret this section to cover a mother's ingestion of illegal substances prior to
the birth of her child would be a radical incursion upon existing law. A person may
not be punished for a crime unless her acts fall clearly within the language of the
.statute. The specific language of [the Nevada child-endangerment statute] does not
allow the strained construction advanced by the state.*
This prosecutorial strategy again failed in State v. Gray.' In this case, an Ohio
woman was originally indicted for child endangerment based on her use of cocaine
during the last trimester of her pregnancy. After the charge was dismissed by the trial
court, the state of Ohio argued that Gray breached her duty of care to the child by
delivering cocaine during the brief moment after birth but before the umbilical cord
was cut. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, held that the Ohio General Assembly did
not intend to criminalize the passage of controlled substances through the umbilical
cord.
In case after case, this method of protecting the unborn child and punishing the
cocaine-abusing expectant mother has failed.' In fact, through 1998, no state supreme
court has ever upheld a conviction of this kind. While clever, this method of concen-
trating on the brief minute between birth and the cutting of the umbilical cord seems to
stretch legislative intent more than the courts will allow. Another strategy, however,
has achieved slightly more success.
42. Section 893.13(l)(c)(1). Florida Statutes (1989) provides as follows: Except as authorized by
this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 18 years of age or older to deliver any controlled substance
to a person under the age of 18 years, or to use or hire a person under the age of 18 years as an
agent or employee in the sale or delivery of such a substance, or to use such person to assist in
avoiding detection or apprehension for a violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this provi-
sion with respect to: 1) A controlled substance . . . is guilty of a felony of the first degree ....
43. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1296.
44. Sheriff of Washoe County v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596 (Nev. 1994).
45. Id. at 598.
46. State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
47. See, eg., State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. CL App. 1988) (holding that statute pro-
scribing delivering and distributing cocaine did not encompass transmission of cocaine metabolites to a
fetus occurring when a pregnant mother ingests cocaine because the child was not a person within the
meaning of the statute at the time transfer took place); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1991) (holding that use of cocaine by pregnant woman is not the type of conduct that legis-




Instead of charging women who used drugs while pregnant with delivery of a
controlled substance to a minor, other state prosecutors have charged such women with
behavior which falls within their state's child abuse and neglect statutes. These cases
involve the challenge for the prosecutor of convincing the court that an unborn child
falls within the definition of "child" in the state's child protection statutes. Although
this strategy has experienced more success than relying on delivery statutes, these
attempts have largely failed as well.
Reyes v. Superior Court' is one of the earliest prosecutions for maternal drug
abuse based on a child endangerment statute. In this case, a pregnant woman who
continued to take heroin despite warnings by medical professionals was charged with
felony child endangerment. Her twin sons were born addicted to heroin and suffered
withdrawal symptoms.' The case was ultimately dismissed by the appellate court,
however, when it concluded that the endangerment statute did not protect a fetus. The
court reasoned that unborn children were not "children" for purposes of the statute."
Subsequent attempts along these lines have usually concluded in the same man-
ner. For example, in State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki,5' the doctor of the peti-
tioner confirmed his suspicions when routine blood tests revealed that Angela was
using cocaine during her pregnancy. Soon after these findings, the Waukesha County
Department of Health and Social Services filed a petition alleging that the thirty-six
week old viable fetus was a child in need of protective services.5 2 The County also
filed a motion requesting the Court to detain the unborn child under section 48.19(l)(c)
of the Wisconsin Statutes. 3 This order recognized that the detention of the unborn
child would by necessity result in the detention of the unborn child's mother.
Relying heavily on legislative history, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to
include a viable fetus within the definition of "child" as read in the statute.54 The
court stated: "Our search to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent results in the
conclusion that the legislature did not intend to include fetus within the definition of
48. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. CL App. 1977).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729 (Wis. 1995).
52. Id. The Wisconsin Children's Code, section 48.13(10) states:
The court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a child alleged to be in need of pro-
tection or services which can be ordered by the court, and whose parent, guardian or
legal custodian neglects, refuses or is unable for reasons other than poverty to provide
necessary care, food, clothing, medical or dental care or shelter so as to seriously endan-
ger the physical health of the child.
WIS. STAT. SEC. 48.13 (1993).
53. The Wisconsin Children's Code, section 48.19(l)(c) states:
(1) A child may be taken into custody under any of the following: . . .(c) An order of
the judge if made upon a showing satisfactory to the judge that the welfare of the child
demands that the child be immediately removed from his or her present custody.
WIs. STAT. SEC. 48.19 (1993).
54. The Wisconsin Children's Code, section 48.02(2) defines "child" as
a person who is less than 18 years of age, except that for purposes of investigating or
prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated a state or federal criminal or any
civil law or municipal ordinance, 'child' does not include a person who has attained 17
years of age.
WIS. STAT. SEC. 48.02 (1993).
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'child.'... Despite ample opportunity, the legislature has not expressly provided that a
fetus is a 'child' under the Code."'55 The court was ill at ease filling this legislative
void on such a controversial issue.56
Relying on child abuse statutes did result in a few successes.5 7 For example, in
1980 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a newborn suffering from narcotics
withdrawal symptoms due to prenatal maternal drug abuse was "neglected" under
Michigan law."8 In 1985, the New York Family Court held that persons under the
Family Court Act included unborn children who are neglected as the result of maternal
conduct. 9 Furthermore, the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio held in 1986 that a
mother's use of heroin close to a baby's birth created a substantial risk to the health of
the child and constituted child abuse under Ohio law.'
Almost always, however, this strategy failed.' Despite the overwhelming evi-
dence that maternal cocaine abuse severely harms the unborn child, very few courts
felt comfortable treading in such unsettled waters. In fact, until 1997, every state su-
preme court that addressed this issue rejected the child abuse argument. This all
changed in the landmark case of Whitner v. State,62 in which the South Carolina Su-
preme Court was presented with the issue of whether a viable fetus is a "person" cov-
ered by the state's child abuse laws.' 3
In Whitner, Cornelia Whitner pled guilty to criminal child neglect for causing her
baby to be born with cocaine metabolites in its system as a result of the mother's
ingestion of crack cocaine during the third trimester of her pregnancy. She was sen-
tenced to eight years in prison. The statute in question was the South Carolina
Children's Code, section 20-7-50, and the issue was whether the word "child" as used
in that statute includes viable fetuses. The statute provides:
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless person, who shall,
without lawful excuse, refuse or neglect to provide, as defined in section 20-7-490,
the proper care and attention for such child or helpless person, so that the life,
health or comfort of such child or helpless person is endangered or is likely to be
endangered, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished within the
discretion of the circuit court."
If a viable fetus is a child, then it is clear that Whitner is liable under the statute
55. Angela, at 740.
56. Id.
57. See, eg., In re Solomon L., 190 Cal. App. 3d 1106, 1111 (Cal. CL App. 1987) (holding that
a mother's use of drugs during pregnancy was neglect for purposes of termination action); In re Ruiz,
500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio Misc. 2nd 1986) (holding that a viable fetus is a child within the meaning
of the child abuse statute).
58. In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. CL App. 1980).
59. In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1985).
60. In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio Misc. 2nd 1986).
61. See, eg., In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Severance Action, 905 P.2d 555 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1995); Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Reyes v. Superior Court,
141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); In re Valerie D., 613 A.2d 748 (Conn. 1992); State v.
Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1991); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky.
1993).
62. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
63. Id. at 779.
64. S.C. CODE ANN. SEc. 20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985). After this case arose, the statute was
amended to change the classification from misdemeanor to felony. 1993 Act. No. 184, Sec. 55 (effec-
tive January 1, 1994).
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since her ingesting crack cocaine certainly endangered or was likely to endanger the
life, health or comfort of her viable fetus. Despite the decisions from other state courts
holding that maternal drug abuse does not give rise to criminal liability, the intrepid
court in this case upheld Whitner's conviction, finding that a viable fetus is a "person"
covered by South Carolina's child-abuse laws.' The question that remains is whether
this decision will influence future courts, or simply become an anomaly in fetal abuse
jurisprudence.
IV. The Concerns
The maternal use of cocaine can result in severe and permanent health conse-
quences for the unborn child. This much is clear. The proper means of protecting the
fetus, however, is far from settled. Whether to hold women who abuse drugs while
pregnant accountable for their behavior, and if so, how, is a matter of contentious
debate. Most states have decided that, while not the ideal result, criminal prosecutions
for maternal drug abuse are the just and proper approach. This method generally re-
ceives widespread public support.' On the other side, many interest groups, health
organizations and others vehemently oppose criminal sanctions in these cases. 7 Those
who espouse this position generally have one or more of the following four concerns.
The first concern, and the only one ultimately concerned with the welfare of the
unborn child, is the harmful deterrent argument. Many believe that prosecuting mater-
nal drug abuse will have the effect of deterring pregnant women with a substance
abuse problem from obtaining adequate prenatal care, thus hurting the fetus more in
the long run. The second concern is a classic slippery slope argument. After all, many
argue, if a woman is criminally liable for the use of cocaine during pregnancy, where
does the law draw the line? Is a pregnant woman criminally liable for drinking, smok-
ing or not eating well? Exercising? Not exercising? Third, many wonder about the
compatibility of these prosecutions and the Supreme Court's decisions in the abortion
arena." These constitutional concerns involve the scope of a pregnant woman's right
to privacy. The fourth argument is a judicial activism concern. Many believe that pro-
tection of the unborn child from maternal drug abuse should come from the legislature
in the form of an express statute to that effect, not from the courts stretching the defi-
nitions of "child" beyond legislative intent.
A. The Harmful Deterrent Argument
One of the most common arguments in opposition to maternal drug abuse prose-
cutions is that such action by the state will ultimately result in less women receiving
the appropriate prenatal care so crucial to a healthy pregnancy. In fear of getting
caught using illegal drugs while pregnant, such women may avoid seeing a doctor, not
65. Whiner, 492 S.E.2d at 779. Under the South Carolina Children's Code, "child" means a "per-
son under the age of eighteen." S.C. CODE ANN. SEC. 20-7-30(1) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
66. Curriden, supra note 36.
67. See, e.g., Report of the American Medical Association Board of Trustees, Helene M. Cole,
M.D., Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatment and Legal Penalties
for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663 (Nov. 28, 1990); Veronique
Mistiaen, Legal Haze: Is Drug-Use During Pregnancy Child Abuse?, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 11, 1992,
Womanews at I (citing the positions of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the March of Dimes
Birth Defects Foundation, and the National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, all opposing
criminal sanctions in such cases in favor of appropriate and accessible treatment).
68. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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receive necessary treatment or medicine, decide to give birth at home or even abort the
child.' As a result, both the expectant mother and unborn child will suffer.
This argument has proven quite influential. For example, a report by the United
States General Accounting Office described fear of prosecution and loss of custody as
a "barrier to treatment" for pregnant women addicted to drugs.7 Similarly, the Ameri-
can Medical Association's Board of Trustees has written: "Criminal penalties may
exacerbate the harm done to fetal health by deterring pregnant substance abusers from
obtaining help or care from either the health or public welfare professions, the very
people who are best able to prevent future abuse."7 ' With such considerations in
mind, the American Medical Association's Board of Trustees advocates for the appro-
priate rehabilitative treatment of pregnant substance abusers and opposes the imposition
of criminal sanctions against such women. Other leading health organizations, in-
cluding the American Academy of Pediatrics, the March of Dimes Birth Defects Foun-
dation and the National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence also oppose
criminal sanctions in favor of appropriate and accessible treatment."3
The position of the California Medical Association effectively summarizes this
argument:
While unhealthy behavior cannot be condoned, to bring criminal charges against a
pregnant woman for activities which may be harmful to her fetus is inappropriate.
Such prosecution is counterproductive to the public interest as it may discourage a
woman from seeking prenatal care or dissuade her from providing accurate infor-
mation to health care providers out of fear of self-incrimination. This failure to
seek proper care or to withhold vital information concerning her health could in-
crease the risks to herself and her baby.74
This argument was crucial in many unsuccessful prosecutions of cocaine-abusing
mothers. For example, the Supreme Court of Florida in Johnson stated: "By imposing
criminal sanctions, women may turn away from seeking prenatal care for fear of being
discovered, undermining the interests of the state in protecting potential human life."'5
The court also expressed the concern that prosecuting "pregnant women for engaging
in activities harmful to their fetuses or newborns may also unwittingly increase the
incidence of abortion."
76
Despite the prevalence of these concerns, they do not warrant states turning a
blind eye at the use of hard drugs such as cocaine by pregnant women. Determining
69. See e.g., Rush, Prenatal Care Taking: Limits of State Intervention With and Without Roe, 39
UNIv. FLA. L. REV. 55, 68 (1986) (noting that a woman would "opt out" of any criminal regulation
by terminating the pregnancy through abortion); see also State v. Gerthers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (referring to Comment, A Response to "Cocaine Babies" -Amendment of Florida Child
Abuse & Neglect Laws to Encompass Infants Born Drug Dependant, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 881
(1987)).
70. Sarah Letitia Kowalski, Comment, Looking For a Solution: Determining Fetal Status For
Prenatal Drug Abuse Prosecutions, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1255, 1259 (1998) (citing U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFicE, DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS: A GENERATION AT RISK (1990)).
71. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Fla. 1992).
72. Id.
73. See Mistiaen, supra note 67.
74. Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1296.
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the deterrent effect of such laws is probably impossible to accurately calculate. There-
fore, one cannot know for sure whether the negative deterrent effects outweigh the
positive deterrent effects. This is all speculation. What is certain, however, is the terri-
bly harmful effects of maternal drug abuse.'
The ingestion of cocaine by a one-month old child as a result of maternal negli-
gence reasonably appears to constitute child abuse or neglect. This behavior is nearly
identical to maternal cocaine use during the ninth month of pregnancy. The only differ-
ence to the child is the means by which the drug enters his or her bloodstream. This
minor difference does not justify criminalizing the behavior in the former instance and
relegating it to a matter of choice for the mother in the later. The reason why the law
punishes a mother who gives cocaine to her child one month after he or she is born is
the same reason why the law should punish a mother who ingests cocaine one month
before her child is born. Both are clear examples of child abuse.
The harmful deterrent argument could also apply against the enforcement of all
child abuse statutes. Child abuse laws could deter a father who severely beats his baby
boy, possibly resulting in bruises, broken bones or damaged internal organs, from
taking his child to the hospital for treatment. Just as an expectant mother might ar-
guably choose to give birth at home to avoid prosecution for maternal child abuse, so
too might the father avoid the hospital in fear of getting caught abusing his son. In this
case, however, the difference between the father and expectant mother is that the
mother is in labor. Such exigent circumstances (including the pain of childbirth) might
actually mitigate the fears of potential prosecution. In other words, the possible harm-
ful deterrent effects of all child abuse laws may in fact affect post-birth more than pre-
birth abuse in some cases.
Furthermore, current laws proscribing cocaine use in general may deter any
woman, pregnant or not, from seeing a doctor. If a routine blood test may uncover
evidence of criminal activity, a person with a substance abuse problem may fear that a
health care professional will report them to the police."8 It is likely that many individ-
uals with cocaine addictions are avoiding necessary medical attention. Current laws
proscribing cocaine, however, still apply to them.
The argument against prosecuting drug abuse by pregnant mothers that relies on
the possible harmful deterrent effects also ignores the other justifications for criminal
punishment. Deterrence is not the only reason to punish behavior that society deems
harmful. Other classic rationales for criminal punishment are retribution, rehabilitation
and incapacitation.79 The woman who uses cocaine while pregnant and gives birth to
a cocaine-addicted baby that will suffer a lifetime of physical, social and psychological
abnormalities simply deserves punishment. Just as the father who beats his baby boy
deserves punishment, so too would such a woman. While in custody, she will be with-
out drugs, may consider the consequences of her actions, and hopefully will take ad-
vantage of whatever counseling services the system provides.
Furthermore, prosecuting maternal drug abuse may foster a public ethos in which
this behavior is no longer tolerated. Combining the shame a mother would feel using
77. See supra notes 8-30 and accompanying text.
78. See e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. SEc. 626.5561 (West 1998) (describing the types of persons
under Minnesota law mandated to report prenatal exposure to controlled substances).
79. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES
AND MATERIALS, 97 (6th ed. 1995).
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drugs while pregnant with the possibility of criminal sanctions could result in a power-
ful positive deterrent effect and may foster a culture in which concern for the unborn
child's health is paramount. The harmful effects of pre-birth and post-birth child abuse
can be identical. The public's outrage should also be identical toward the different
behaviors that cause the harm. A simple analogy may illustrate. A man can break
another man's nose by throwing a brick at it or by hitting it with his fist. With the
harm equivalent, which behavior is worse? Should one be criminalized and the other a
matter of choice?
B. The Slippery Slope Argument
Another commonly expressed concern about the prosecution of maternal drug
abuse regards the scope of the definition of "abuse." While the medical evidence clear-
ly demonstrates the deleterious health consequences of maternal cocaine ingestion on
the fetus, a myriad of other behaviors the expectant mother may engage in could also
possibly harm her unborn child. Some of the behaviors which might hurt a fetus could
include failure to obtain adequate prenatal care, smoking, drinking alcoholic beverages,
high-impact exercise, poor sleep habits, or even a poor diet. The question concerns a
mother's duty of care to her unborn child and its appropriate scope. This concern is
echoed by the Ohio appellate court in State v. Gray.') The state of Ohio argued that
the mother had a duty of care to her child during the time after birth but before the
umbilical cord was cut, and that the passage of cocaine to her child through the cord
violated that duty. The appellate court, however, concluded that the Ohio legislature
did not intend to criminalize this event, and stated: "To construe the statute in this
manner would mean that every expectant woman who ingested a substance with the
potential of harm to her child, e.g., alcohol or nicotine, would be criminally liable
under [the child endangering statute]. We do not believe such a result was intended by
the General Assembly."'"
The phrase "slippery slope" was even used by the court in Sheriff of Washoe
County v. Encoe.Y The Nevada Supreme Court, interpreting the Nevada child endan-
germent statute, overturned the conviction of a woman whose newborn child tested
positive for amphetamines. The court argued that holding a woman criminally liable in
such cases would be a:
Radical incursion upon existing law.., to hold otherwise... would open the
floodgates to prosecution of pregnant women who ingest such things as alcohol,
nicotine, and a [large] range of miscellaneous, otherwise legal, toxins ... [which]
if validated, might lead to a 'slippery slope' whereby the law could be construed as
covering the full range of a pregnant woman's behavior.'
Opponents of state intervention have utilized this concern to create a scare tactic
employed effectively in the mainstream media.84 Fear is a strong emotion and hard to
argue against, especially when commentators warn of an impending "pregnancy police"
out to prosecute women who fail to follow their doctor's orders.' Such dire predic-
80. State v. Gray, 1990 WL 125695, *1 (Ohio Ct. App.) (unpublished opinion).
81. Id.
82. Sheriff of Washoe County v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596 (Nev. 1994).
83. Id. at 598.




tions, however, are unrealistic at best and instead serve to distract the public's growing
and justified concern over maternal cocaine abuse.
Slippery slope arguments are, by their nature, suspect:
In virtually every case in which a slippery slope argument is made, the opposing
party could with equal formal and linguistic logic also make a slippery slope
claim.... Slippery slope claims deserve to be viewed skeptically, and the propo-
nent of such a claim must be expected to provide the necessary empirical sup-
port.
Those in favor of maternal child abuse prosecutions could make a slippery slope
argument as well. One such slippery slope claim could concern a parent's potential
liability under current child abuse laws for otherwise legal behavior which may harm
their children already born. Second hand smoke may cause cancer. Is a mother liable
for child abuse if she incessantly smokes around her two year old? Is it child abuse if
a parent neglects to take their girl to the dentist regularly and as a result she suffers
permanent dental problems? At what point does socially acceptable spanking cross
over into abuse? What about feeding a child an unhealthy diet? How many snack food
dinners constitutes child abuse? These concerns, however, are not effective arguments
against the enforcement of all child abuse laws.
Another possible slippery slope argument could concern the health and welfare
of the child. If a mother may poison her child with cocaine one month before he or
she is born, why not one month after? One could even argue that a parent severely
beating their child with a belt (or fist) is a family disciplinary matter beyond the state's
regulation.
The point is that slippery slope arguments are inherently dubious and logically
apply equally to both sides of an argument. Just as the states do not concern them-
selves with a family's dietary quality, a state will not bother its already back-logged
and overburdened criminal justice system with a pregnant woman's poor sleep habits.
The trivial will not be tried, but if such an attempt is made, the judge in this situation
should distinguish between truly harmful behaviors (such as maternal cocaine abuse)
and acceptable instances of parental discretion. If this is not done, volatile slippery
slope fears will react and society will experience the eventual erosion of legitimate
child abuse laws.
C. The Constitutional Argument
Attempts to prosecute women for behavior harmful to their fetus raise interesting
constitutional questions. A constitutional right to privacy exists which covers a large
range of intimate and personal affairs beyond the sphere of permitted governmental
intrusion.87 Regulations which attempt to encroach upon fundamental rights must be
justified by a "compelling state interest" and narrowly tailored to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake.88 The Supreme Court in Roe pronounced that a
woman's right to privacy even includes a right to obtain an abortion in some cases. 9
As a result, numerous commentators believe efforts to hold women liable for maternal
86. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 363, 381-382 (1985).
87. See supra note 3.




cocaine ingestion are unconstitutional because such efforts violate a woman's right to
privacy."
While the right to an abortion, post-Roe, is a fundamental right, the use of illegal
drugs such as cocaine does not rise to the level of a protected liberty interest.9' In
addition, no individual, mother or father, has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in placing a child at a substantial risk of physical injury.' There is simply no consti-
tutional right to use cocaine during any stage of pregnancy, and statutes proscribing
such behavior do not burden a fundamental right. To illustrate, consider the South Car-
olina Supreme Court's statement in Whitner
Even more importantly, however, we do not think any fundamental right of
Whitner's- or any right at all, for that matter- is implicated under the present sce-
nario. It strains belief for Whitner to argue that using crack cocaine during preg-
nancy is encompassed within the constitutionally recognized right of privacy. Use
of crack cocaine is illegal, period. No one here argues that laws criminalizing the
use of crack cocaine are themselves unconstitutional. If the State wishes to impose
additional criminal penalties on pregnant women who engage in this already illegal
conduct because of the effect the conduct has on the viable fetus, it may do so. We
do not see how the fact of pregnancy elevates the use of crack cocaine to the lofty
status of a fundamental right.'
However, it is possible that the enforcement of maternal child abuse statutes may
impinge upon a woman's right to privacy. If a fundamental right is involved, a mater-
nal child abuse statute will only survive a constitutional challenge if it is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
The Supreme Court established in Roe and Planned Parenthood v. Casey that the
state has a compelling and legitimate interest in the life of the viable94 fetus and the
potentiality of that life:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the
"compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has
the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation pro-
tective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifica-
tions."
The Court also observed that "(c)ourts sustaining state laws have held that the State's
90. See, e.g., Michelle D. Mills, Comment, Fetal Abuse Prosecutions: The Triumph of Reaction
Over Reason, 47 DEPAuL L. REV. 989 (1998); Kowalski, supra note 37.
91. State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 714 (Ohio 1992) (Wright, I., dissenting).
92. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (holding that the state's interest in the
psychological and physical well-being of children who were abused outweighed a defendant's 6 h
Amendment right); Baltimore City Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990) (holding
that there is no 5' Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in child abuse case); Osborn v.
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (holding that the state's interest in safe-guarding children outweighed
defendant's 1 Amendment rights).
93. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 1997).
94. A viable child is defined as
an unborn child who is capable of independent existence outside his or her mother's
womb, even if only in an incubator. In most states a viable unborn child is considered a
person under the wrongful death statute, and in some states is considered to be a person
under a homicide statute.
BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 1084 (6th ed. 1991).
95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
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determination to protect health or prenatal life are dominant and constitutionally justifi-
able." In Casey, the Court stated that "Roe speaks with clarity in establishing not
only the woman's liberty but also the State's important and legitimate interest in po-
tential life. That portion of the Roe decision has been given too little acknowledgment
by the Court in subsequent cases." Therefore, at the moment the unborn child be-
comes viable, the state has a compelling interest in his or her health and may proscribe
maternal use of cocaine as long as the state's interest is narrowly tailored. This is true
even if enforcement of such a statute burdens a fundamental right." Whether the
state's fetal abuse statute is narrowly tailored is highly fact specific and determinable
only on a case-by-case basis.
It is important to further consider the Court's statement in Roe that "person as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unborn." Based on this
claim it would seem axiomatic that if an unborn child is not a "person," he or she
cannot be a "child" as used in child abuse statutes across the country. Terms like "per-
son," "child" and "fetus," however, are legal terms of art which complicate the matter
significantly. For example, a corporation is a "person" under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."m
The fact that an unborn child is not a legal "person" does not mean he or she has
no legal rights or that the state has no interest in the unborn child's health or welfare.
In fact, the rights of a fetus are recognized in other areas of the law. For example,
under Wisconsin law, unborn fetuses are protected under property and inheritance
law,"0 ' tort law,"° and criminal law. 3 In reaching its conclusion, the court in
Whimer considered the fact that a viable fetus has long been recognized as a person
under South Carolina law in regards to its wrongful death statute.'" The viable fetus
injured while still in the womb need not even be born alive for another to maintain a
wrongful death cause of action in South Carolina." Also, under South Carolina's
murder statute,a viable fetus is again a "person."'" For example, if a man stabs
his pregnant wife in the womb resulting in the death of the unborn child, he is liable
for the crime of feticide. The Whitner court reasoned that it is grossly inconsistent to
construe a viable fetus as a person for the purposes of imposing civil liability while
refusing to give it a similar classification in the criminal context." The court con-
cluded that it was therefore not only logically consistent, but necessary from a health
perspective, to hold that a viable fetus is a "child" within the meaning of South
96. Id. at 156.
97. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992).
98. See supra note 90.
99. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
100. U.S. v. Amedy, 24 U.S. 392 (1826).
101. See Kwaterski v. State Farm, 148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967).
102. Id.; see also Vandervelden v. Victoria, 502 N.W.2d 276 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
103. See State v. Black, 526 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1994); see also Parness and Pritchard, To Be or
Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1982) (examining
six areas of state law that affect the unborn: inheritance, trusts, crimes, torts, birth law and custody).
104. Whimer v. State, 492 S.E.2d at 779 (quoting Hall v. Murphy,113 S.E.2d 790, 793 (S.C.
1960)).
105. See id. at 780 (quoting Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44 (S.C. 1964)).
106. S.C. CODE ANN. Sec. 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).




Carolina's child abuse and endangerment statute."
D. The Judicial Activism Argument
The final commonly expressed argument against maternal drug abuse prosecu-
tions concerns the proper role of the judiciary. Those with this concern believe that a
legislature intent on protecting unborn children from maternal drug abuse should draft
a fetal abuse statute expressly to this effect. The statute should clearly state that its use
of the word "child" includes viable fetuses. In the absence of such an unambiguous
statute, a judge must refrain from interpreting current child abuse laws beyond legisla-
tive intent.
For example, the court in People v. Hardy" stated:
The Legislature is an appropriate forum to discuss public policy, as well as the
complexity of prenatal drug use, its effect upon an infant, and its
criminalization .... A court should not place a tenuous construction on [a] statute
to address a problem to which the legislative attention is readily directed and which
it can readily resolve if in its judgment it is an appropriate subject of legisla-
tion."
' '
Similarly, in Stallman v. Youngquist,"2 the court stated, "[If a legally cognizable
duty on the part of pregnant women to their developing fetuses is to be recognized, the
decision must come from the legislature only after thorough investigation, study and
debate."" 3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has echoed this concern: "We determine
that the legislature is in a better position than the courts to gather, weigh, and reconcile
the competing policy proposals addressed to this sensitive area of the law."" 4
When a court approaches a maternal cocaine abuse case from this perspective,
the case becomes a simple one of statutory construction. The two primary rules of
statutory construction in the criminal context are the rules of strict construction and
leniency." 5 The application of these rules will almost certainly defeat any attempt to
hold pregnant women liable under "delivery" statutes for passing cocaine to their child
through the umbilical cord. For example, the Johnson court stated that when the lan-
guage of a statute is susceptible to differing interpretations, the statute must be con-
strued in a way most favorable to the accused." 6 The court concluded: "We find that
the legislative history does not show a manifest intent to use the word 'delivery' in the
context of criminally prosecuting mothers for delivery of a controlled substance to a
minor by way of the umbilical cord."""
The statutory construction involved in attempts to prosecute maternal drug abuse
under current child abuse statutes revolves around the definition of "child." Lynn
Paltrow, the litigation director of the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy in New
York, argues that neither the states nor the federal government have made it a crime to
109. See id.
110. People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
111. Id. at 53 (quoting People v. Gilbert, 324 N.W.2d 834, 844 (Mich. 1982)).
112. Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (III. 1988).
113. Id. at 361.
114. State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 739 (Wis. 1995).





give birth to a substance-addicted baby.' 8 Therefore, prosecutors have charged moth-
ers in such circumstances under statutes, such as child abuse or endangerment, that
were not intended to protect fetuses.' ' This concern is echoed in the courts. For ex-
ample, in ruling against the state in State of Wisconsin ex rel. Angela M.W., the Wis-
consin Supreme Court stated:
Because we determine that the legislature did not intend to include a fetus within
the Children's Code definition of "child," we reverse the decision of the court of
appeals. Although we visit in the facts of this case the daunting social problem of
drug use during pregnancy, the essence of this case is one of statutory con-
struction."m
While the use of "delivery" statutes to combat maternal cocaine use seems to
impermissibly stretch legislative intent, a court can reasonably interpret child abuse
statutes to protect unborn children from their cocaine-abusing mothers. As stated
above, unborn children are recognized as "persons" with legal rights in many other
areas of the law.' It is inconsistent to construe a viable fetus as a person for the
purposes of imposing civil liability while refusing to give it a similar classification in
the criminal context. If an unborn child is a "person"9 in the legal sense, he or she is
also certainly a "child" and thus protected by current child abuse statutes.
Those opposed to holding women accountable for maternal cocaine use are often
at the same time in favor of a women's right to obtain an abortion and champion the
Supreme Court's decisions in Roe and Casey. These cases, however, are classic ex-
amples of judicial activism, prompting Justice Scalia to state in his dissent in Casey,
"[tihe Imperial Judiciary lives."'" It is interesting that those who cry "judicial activ-
ism" in the prosecution of maternal drug abuse endorse such activism in the abortion
context.
V. Conclusion
In a recent book addressing the issue of maternal drug use, Deborah Mathieu
suggests that:
[I]ntervention would have to meet certain fundamental tests before it would be jus-
tifiable: (1) The harm to be prevented to the future person is grave and irreversible;
(2) the harm to the mother is relatively minor, (3) the intervention involves the
least intrusive means available; (4) the intervention will be successful in preventing
or at least ameliorating serious prenatal harm; (5) requirements of due process and
equal protection of the law are met; and (6) the benefits of adopting this type of
state intervention as social policy will greatly outweigh the disbenefits.'
The relatively recent efforts by the states to protect unborn children from their cocaine-
abusing mothers and to punish women who engage in such behavior are consistent
with this moderate and sensible standard. The harm to the unborn child simply out-
118. See Mistiaen, supra note 67.
119. See id.
120. 561 N.W.2d at 731-32 (Wis. 1995).
121. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
122. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).




weighs the concerns expressed. A woman's right to privacy does not include a right to
use an illegal drug while pregnant. Slippery slope fears are unrealistic. The positive or
negative deterrent effects of fetal abuse laws are unknown, and it is logically consistent
to hold that a fetus is a person in both the civil and criminal contexts. The consequenc-
es of abuse or neglect which takes place after birth often pale in comparison to those
resulting from abuse suffered by the viable fetus before birth. Children deserve to
begin life clean of any addictions forced upon them by their mothers.""
The state has a compelling and legitimate interest in the health of a viable un-
born child."z In the absence of a fetal abuse statute, the most realistic and reasonable
mechanism in the criminal context to vindicate this interest is through existing child
abuse and neglect statutes. Efforts to protect an unborn child and statutes to that effect,
however, must ensure the necessary protections against unreasonable or unjustified
intervention by the state. Imprudent state intervention will undermine public support
for such efforts and ultimately render the state powerless to protect unborn children.
Experience may prove, however, that criminal penalties are unworkable. States
should therefore also expand the existing civil remedy of taking temporary custody of
children born addicted to a controlled substance. As was attempted in State of Wiscon-
sin ex rel. Angela M.W., 26 states should place pregnant women using cocaine in pro-
tective custody 7 or commit them to protect the unborn child. These civil reme-
dies would serve to promote the state's interest in the health of the viable unborn child
and ideally provide such women with the necessary treatment and counseling they
need.
Regardless of whether a state uses its criminal laws or civil remedies, the health
of the unborn child is only truly protected if effective drug treatment programs are
readily available to pregnant women while in custody. In many states, treatment is not
considered a priority and has taken a back-seat to criminal prosecutions. This approach
fails to realize that inpatient treatment is an integral part of an overall state scheme to
protect unborn children from the horrors of maternal cocaine abuse. While the
mother's behavior deserves punishment, the health of the unborn child is simply more
important.
Thousands of expectant mothers today are abusing hard drugs like cocaine. These
women and their unborn children are suffering. As part of a culture which does not
tolerate such abuse, states must, with a hard head but a soft heart, continue to take
action to prevent and punish this behavior. Using cocaine while pregnant is not a
choice society can tolerate.
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